Mimikatz

Quick Reference Attack Tool Prerequisite Output Kerberoasting Rubeus, PowerView Domain user, SPN exists RC4/AES hash → offline crack AS-REP Roasting Rubeus Domain user, pre-auth disabled on target AS-REP hash → offline crack Pass-the-Ticket Rubeus, Mimikatz Valid .kirbi or base64 ticket Ticket injected into session Overpass-the-Hash Mimikatz, Rubeus NTLM or AES hash TGT obtained, ticket injected Pass-the-Key Mimikatz AES256 hash TGT obtained via AES pre-auth Ticket Extraction Rubeus, Mimikatz Local admin (for other users’ tickets) .kirbi files / base64 tickets TGT Delegation Rubeus tgtdeleg Domain user, no local admin needed Usable TGT Ticket Harvesting Rubeus harvest/monitor Local admin Ongoing TGT collection Unconstrained Delegation Abuse Rubeus monitor + coerce Local admin on delegation host Victim TGT captured Hashcat Cracking Modes Reference Mode Hash Type Attack Context 13100 Kerberoast — RC4 (TGS-REP) Kerberoasting with /rc4opsec 19600 Kerberoast — AES128 (TGS-REP) Kerberoasting with /aes 19700 Kerberoast — AES256 (TGS-REP) Kerberoasting with /aes 18200 AS-REP — RC4 (krb5asrep) AS-REP Roasting 17200 DPAPI masterkey Seatbelt / Mimikatz DPAPI 1000 NTLM Pass-the-Hash, secretsdump output 5600 NTLMv2 (Net-NTLMv2) Responder / NTLM relay capture 7500 Kerberos 5 AS-REQ (etype 23) Pre-auth brute force 3000 LM Legacy — rarely seen Kerberoasting Kerberoasting requests Kerberos service tickets (TGS-REP) for accounts with a Service Principal Name (SPN) set. The ticket is encrypted with the service account’s password hash, enabling offline cracking. ...

Quick Reference Attack Tool Privilege Required LSASS dump (live) Mimikatz LocalAdmin + SeDebugPrivilege LSASS dump (ProcDump) ProcDump / comsvcs.dll LocalAdmin DCSync Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync Domain Admin (or replication rights) Local SAM reg save + secretsdump LocalAdmin LSA Secrets Mimikatz lsadump::lsa SYSTEM Cached domain creds Mimikatz lsadump::cache SYSTEM GPP passwords PowerSploit Get-GPPPassword Domain User (SYSVOL read) DPAPI triage SharpDPAPI LocalAdmin (backup key needs DA) WDigest cleartext Mimikatz sekurlsa::wdigest LocalAdmin + WDigest enabled Skeleton key Mimikatz misc::skeleton Domain Admin (DC access) SSP injection Mimikatz misc::memssp SYSTEM on DC Password spray DomainPasswordSpray / Rubeus Domain User PPL bypass mimidrv.sys kernel driver SYSTEM + vulnerable driver Mimikatz — Core Commands Mimikatz is the primary credential extraction tool for Windows. Most operations require SeDebugPrivilege at minimum, and many require SYSTEM. ...

Quick Reference Technique Tool Requirement Pass-the-Hash (PtH) Mimikatz, Invoke-TheHash, PsExec Local Admin / NTLM hash Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) Rubeus, Mimikatz Valid Kerberos ticket (.kirbi / base64) Overpass-the-Hash Mimikatz, Rubeus NTLM or AES256 hash WMI Exec PowerShell WMI, wmic, SharpWMI Local Admin on target DCOM Exec PowerShell COM objects Local Admin / DCOM permissions PowerShell Remoting Enter-PSSession, Invoke-Command WinRM enabled, appropriate rights PsExec Sysinternals PsExec Local Admin, ADMIN$ writable Remote Service sc.exe Local Admin on target Scheduled Task schtasks.exe Local Admin / valid credentials Token Impersonation Incognito, Invoke-TokenManipulation SeImpersonatePrivilege RDP mstsc, tscon RDP enabled, valid credentials or SYSTEM Pass-the-Hash (PtH) Pass-the-Hash abuses the NTLM authentication protocol by presenting a captured password hash directly instead of the cleartext password. The target authenticates the hash without needing the plaintext credential. ...

Quick Reference Attack Requirement Tool Cross-domain Kerberoast Valid domain user in child Rubeus Parent-Child escalation krbtgt hash of child Mimikatz / Rubeus Diamond Ticket cross-domain krbtgt AES256 + DA creds Rubeus One-way inbound abuse DCSync TDO object Mimikatz One-way outbound abuse DCSync TDO GUID Mimikatz Cross-forest Kerberoast Trust configured Rubeus Trust Concepts Trust Types Type Value Description DOWNLEVEL 1 Windows NT 4.0-style trust UPLEVEL 2 Active Directory (Kerberos-based) trust MIT 3 Non-Windows Kerberos realm DCE 4 Theoretical, not used in practice Parent-Child Trust — A two-way, transitive trust automatically created when a new domain is added to an existing tree. The child domain and parent domain mutually authenticate via Kerberos. ...

Quick Reference Table Technique Tool Requirement Stealth Level Golden Ticket Mimikatz / Rubeus krbtgt hash + DOMAIN_SID Medium Silver Ticket Mimikatz / Rubeus Service account hash High Diamond Ticket Rubeus krbtgt AES256 + DA creds High DCSync rights backdoor PowerView Domain Admin Low AdminSDHolder abuse PowerView Domain Admin Low DPAPI Backup Key SharpDPAPI Domain Admin High Skeleton Key Mimikatz Domain Admin (LSASS access) Low WMI Event Subscription PowerShell Local Admin Medium SID History Mimikatz Domain Admin Medium DCSync What it is: Abuse of the Directory Replication Service (DRS) protocol to impersonate a domain controller and request password data for any account directly from a legitimate DC. No file on disk needs to be touched — the DC simply hands over the hashes on request, because that is exactly what the DRS protocol is designed to do between DCs. ...